In
December 2011, Vladimir Putin told the press that his government welcomes
non-extremist opposition and is open to dialogue. When a journalist suggested
to get the leaders of the opposition together, however, the then Prime Minister
retorted that the opposition is too varied and does not present a united
political platform, and so negotiating with each group about its specific
demands needs to be thought through. Putin was riding high after the United
Russia party with which he is associated ‘won’ the Parliamentary election
earlier in December, so he could afford to be dismissive. He also had a point.
Since the first mass protests took off, following allegations of wide-spread
ballot-stuffing in December, three key figures began to dominate the marches. Alexei
Navalny, Sergei Udaltsov and Boris Nemtsov have, in the past six months of
protests, spent enough time in prison for Amnesty International to take notice.
All call for electoral and political reform, control over the actions of the
government, release of political prisoners and new, open elections. Admirable
goals, which united hundreds of thousands of people. But, taken separately, the
three men’s politics are so disparate, it is difficult to imagine them at the
same party together, let alone on a political stage.
Responsible
for the catchy epithet ‘party of crooks and thieves’, now recognised by more
than 2/3 of the population, Alexei Navalny came to prominence after launching
in December 2010 of his RosPil project, which literally translates as ‘sawing
apart’ – a website that discloses corruption by public officials by analysing
financial documents available online. The project became a mass phenomenon,
earning Navalny 6th place in Time’s
100 most influential people of 2012 list. His approach is to tell it like it is
and not take any prisoners, coupled with a background in law, make him for a
formidable public figure. But aye, there is the rub.
In
2007, Navalny founded the ‘People’ movement, whose manifesto declares that
Russia is facing a national catastrophe as the population ‘degrades and dies
off’. To prevent this, the movement calls on national rehabilitation, freedom
and justice, and asserts that the Russian people have earned their right to
live in a democracy. But that is exactly the problem - the emphasis is on the
‘Russian’. Navalny’s ideal is that of a ‘nationalist democracy’, in which
immigration policy is of paramount importance. When he talks about his
nationalism, Navalny sounds very reasonable and convincing. He calls for
assimilation of immigrants into the traditions and laws of Russia, and
envisions it as a ‘bigger, more irrational and metaphysical Canada’. In his
interviews, he is either purposely evasive, or he really believes that
nationalist sentiments can be indeed have a ‘human face’. The problem jolts you
in the face when, in answer to the question whether he agrees with the mission
statement of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration (DPNI) – Russia’s answer
to the English Defense League that was banned in 2011 as extremist – he says
‘Yes, why, is something wrong with it?’ Navalny may truly fool himself into
believing that by attending the Russian March rallies where slogans like
‘Russia for Russians!’ are a staple, he can somehow make them, in his own
words, ‘better’. But he occupies an unfavourable public position: the far right
sees him as too moderate while the liberal opposition shuns his nationalistic
views and currently sees no political future for him. A real shame for someone
who managed, so forcefully, to grab the attention and admiration of the Russian
public.
Sergei
Udaltsov, for all his admirable fervour and resilience in face of multiple
arrests, really wants to turn Russia into one giant kibbutz. In 2008, Udaltsov,
also a lawyer, was elected onto the executive committee of the Left Front – a
political movements whose main goal is the creation of socialism in Russia. The
list of grievances is familiar: corruption, disintegration of culture, science,
education, health, army and the police.
The way to overcome these problems is to combine public property with true
‘people-power’ – a political and production democracy. Lenin’s call was ‘Land
to the people, factories to the workers!’ In the new version, ‘each worker is
an owner, and each owner, a worker’. As a side note, the manifesto states that
small private property will not be expropriated in this fight against global
bourgeois capitalism (oh yes, you heard right) as it must prove itself in free
economic competition with public property – whatever that means. The raison d’être
of this movement, is, no more not less, to ‘accelerate the movement of history!’
In
2010, Udaltsov founded ROT-Front – United Russian Workers’ Front (a holler back
to 1917, again), based largely on the policies of the Left Front and calling
specifically for social justice and protection for all – and not just the rich
and powerful. There is a call to share the oil and gas wealth with the
population, to introduce a luxury tax and access of each individual to
objective and accurate information that ‘precludes manipulation of public
consciousness’. Just how the movement plans to convince the unconvinced, then,
remains a technical mystery. But while the Left Front strictly excludes
cooperation with any reactionary ideology – such as nationalism, fascism or liberalism, the ROT-front announces
its readiness to coordinate with any political party whose goal is democracy.
If you are thinking these view are too weird to warrant cooperation, don’t:
Russia’s Communist Party’s presidential candidate Gennady Zuganov, endorsed by
Udaltsov, came in second after Putin with 17% of the vote.
Boris
Nemtsov, a professional politician who was groomed by Boris Yeltsin as a
potential successor before Putin, is probably the better known and most
credible face of the three. He has a solid record as a liberal, becoming the
first governor of the new Russia in 1991, and is perhaps best remembered by the
public for being doused with mango juice by the eccentric leader of the Liberal
Democratic Party of Russia (which is neither liberal, nor democratic) during a
debate in the 1990s. At the moment, he is one of the 39 committee members of
the Solidarnost’ Movement, founded in 2008, whose main goal is to create a
competitive economic and political system in the country. The organisation’s 300 Steps to Freedom programme is the most
extensive and conclusive, offering a course of European-style development and
free parliamentary elections with full access by all parties to the public
information systems. In 2010, Nemtsov along with ex-Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov
a number of young politicians founded the Party of People’s Liberty – PARNAS, but
the ministry of Justice refused to register it, citing contradictions to
federal law. If anything, this bureaucratic snub is an indicator of the potential
threat of the movement – which attracts many prominent public figures – to the
Putin regime.
So
far, however, the only idea uniting the three main strands of the opposition is
the call to liberalise the electoral system to allow for fair elections and
political competition. But with the Kremlin’s power undiminished, and the
protest rigour in decline, what the opposition needs is a better focus and a
realistic political platform to offer to the electorate. There needs to be a
plan for when the protest party is over. Political competition is a great
thing, but when there are too many little Davids facing different sides of
Goliath, the pebbles might hurt, but most likely will not kill the current
corrupt system in place. And this dilemma is what gives Russia’s ‘non-systemic’
opposition a flailing double meaning.
